Business & Industrial Economics: One-Page Concepts
Every concept with a diagram and a well-known company example. Examples tagged course come from the clips or wrap-ups and may appear in the exam; the others are only memory aids. ← All BIE resources
1 Industry profits and market power (01.01)
flowchart LR
MP["Market power<br>p > MC"] --> W["Wealth transfer<br>buyers who still buy pay more"]
MP --> AI["Allocative inefficiency<br>buyers with WTP between MC and p drop out"]
MP --> PI["Productive inefficiency<br>no pressure to cut costs"]
MP --> RC["Capture of the regulator<br>lobbying to keep privileges"]
W & AI & PI & RC --> POL{"Policy"}
POL --> AT["Antitrust<br>block cartels and mergers"]
POL --> RG["Regulation<br>set prices directly"]
class MP key
class AI bad
| Concept | In one line | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Industry | Firms whose products consumers see as substitutes. Check the geographic dimension: demand-side (will buyers buy from elsewhere?) and supply-side (will firms sell elsewhere?) | Coca-Cola and Pepsi are in the same industry; so are Netflix and Disney+ |
| Profit drivers | Demand, costs, number and intensity of competitors | Pfizer and other pharma firms earn high margins; telecoms like TIM and Vodafone earn low ones (coursepharma vs telecom) |
| Four ways to escape competition | Differentiation, collusion, entry barriers, innovation | Apple (differentiation), OPEC (collusion), taxi licences vs Uber (barriers), Nvidia's AI chips (innovation) |
| Market power | The ability to price above marginal cost | An iPhone sells far above the cost of making one more unit |
| Allocative inefficiency | People who value the good above MC but below the price do not buy; that lost surplus is the dead-weight loss | Someone would pay €500 for an iPhone (above its cost) but it costs €1,000, so the beneficial trade never happens |
| Productive inefficiency | No competitive pressure, so costs stay high | Alitalia, long protected by the state, ran at much higher costs than Ryanair |
| Capture of the regulator | When market power comes from policy, firms spend resources lobbying to keep it | Italian taxi drivers lobbying and striking against Uber (coursetaxi licences) |
| Antitrust vs regulation | Antitrust protects competition; regulation sets prices directly | EU fines on Google (antitrust); Italy's ARERA sets energy network tariffs (regulation) |
Wealth transfer is about units that ARE sold. Allocative inefficiency is about trades that do NOT happen.
2 Transaction costs (01.05)
flowchart LR SI["Relation-specific investment<br>only useful for this buyer"] --> HU["Hold-up<br>the other side squeezes the price later"] IC["Incomplete contracts<br>bounded rationality"] --> HU HU --> TC["High transaction costs"] TC --> INT["Internalise<br>buy the supplier or distributor"] class HU bad class INT key
| Concept | In one line | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Transaction costs | All costs of completing a deal: search, negotiation, contract, checking it is honoured | Selling a used phone on Vinted or eBay: find a buyer, agree a price, make sure you get paid |
| Ex ante vs ex post | Before: search, drafting. After: monitoring, enforcement (even court) | Airbnb: filtering listings is ex ante; a guest who breaks furniture and refuses to pay is ex post (course) |
| Why firms exist | Buying every step on the market would cost too much, so steps are done inside one firm | Zara designs, produces and ships to its own stores instead of negotiating each step |
| Relation-specific investment | An investment made for one deal, worthless if the deal fails | Foxconn lines built only for iPhones |
| Hold-up | The side that did not invest exploits contract gaps; the investor is locked in | GM and Fisher Body (course): GM ended up buying Fisher Body |
| Economies of scope | Making two products together is cheaper than separately | Amazon runs its own retail, third-party sellers and Prime on one logistics network |
3 Information asymmetry (01.07 to 01.10)
flowchart TB A["Information asymmetry"] --> B["Before the deal: hidden information"] A --> C["After the deal: hidden action"] B --> D["Adverse selection"] C --> E["Moral hazard"] D --> F["Fix: signalling<br>costly, costlier for low types, observable"] E --> G["Fix: incentive contracts<br>deductible, fixed + variable pay, staging"] class D,E bad class F,G key
| Concept | In one line | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Adverse selection | Quality is hidden, buyers pay the average, good sellers leave, only lemons remain | Used cars (courseAkerlof), which is why AutoScout24-style platforms add inspection reports |
| Signalling | An observable cue correlated with quality, costlier for low types. Separating condition c_H < w_H − w_L < c_L | A Polimi degree or a Google internship; Airbnb Superhost (course) |
| Moral hazard | After the contract, the other side's behaviour is hidden and they act opportunistically | Full theft insurance, so no good padlock (course); an Airbnb guest throwing a party (course) |
| Principal-agent | The principal delegates to an agent whose interests differ | Tesla shareholders and their CEO |
| Incentive contract | Makes opportunism unattractive | Musk's 2018 pay package tied entirely to market-value milestones; insurance deductibles |
| Staging | VC money released in tranches when milestones are hit | Airbnb and Uber raising Seed, Series A, B, C |
Before the deal = adverse selection = signalling. After the deal = moral hazard = incentive contracts. Do not cross the pairs.
4 Monopoly and oligopoly (02.02 to 02.04)
flowchart LR M["Monopoly<br>MR = MC<br>highest price, lowest output"] --> CO["Cournot duopoly<br>choose quantities<br>middle price, positive profit"] CO --> BE["Bertrand duopoly<br>identical goods, set prices<br>p = MC, zero profit"] BE --> PC["Perfect competition<br>p = MC"] class M bad class PC key
flowchart TB MO["Where does the monopoly come from?"] --> L["An exclusive legal right<br>→ Legal monopoly"] MO --> R["Control of a key resource<br>→ Monopoly of resources"] MO --> N["Cost structure: average cost keeps falling, small market<br>one firm is cheapest, a second raises everyone's cost<br>→ Natural monopoly"] class N key
| Concept | In one line | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Legal monopoly | An exclusive right granted by law, e.g. a patent | Novo Nordisk's Ozempic during its patent life |
| Monopoly of resources | Exclusive control of a key resource | De Beers once controlled most diamond mines; Saudi Aramco (courseMENA oil) |
| Natural monopoly | High fixed cost, low variable cost: one firm is most efficient | Terna's electricity grid or the water pipes: building two networks only raises costs |
| Monopoly pricing | Lower elasticity, higher markup: (p − mc)/p = 1/|ε|. MR has twice the slope of demand | EpiPen: patients cannot go without it, demand is inelastic, and Mylan raised the price sharply for years |
| Bertrand trap | Identical goods, simultaneous prices: undercutting until p = MC and zero profit | Eni and Q8 stations on the same road charge almost the same (coursefuel is homogeneous) |
| Collusion | Jointly keeping prices high. Stable with repeated interaction (punishment), good future profits, low discount rate | OPEC coordinating output |
| Cournot | Choose capacity or quantity, anticipating the rival's output. Markup (p − MC)/p = s_i/|ε|: bigger share, bigger markup | Airbus and Boeing decide how many planes to build; prices follow total supply |
Low elasticity means the firm CAN raise price (customers cannot leave). It does not mean "cut price to keep volume".
5 Product differentiation (02.05)
| Concept | In one line | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Differentiation | Lowers substitutability and demand elasticity, avoiding price wars | Starbucks sells a "third place" experience at prices far above a vending machine |
| Spatial differentiation | Same product, different places; the closer seller can charge up to the travel cost | The convenience store downstairs costs more than the supermarket further away, and you still go |
| Hotelling | Two beach vendors end up side by side in the middle | McDonald's and Burger King often open next to each other |
| When not to differentiate | If preferences barely vary, heavy differentiation does not pay; collusion or joint supply restriction instead | Eni and Shell fuel is basically the same (course) |
| Coopetition | With high spillovers, co-develop and then compete | Toyota and BMW share a platform (Supra and Z4) and sell under their own brands |
6 Entry barriers and predatory pricing (02.06 to 02.08)
flowchart TB
EB["Entry barriers"] --> I["Institutional<br>set by policy: licences, permits, patents"]
EB --> S["Structural<br>demand and cost structure: scale, learning curves, scarce resources"]
EB --> ST["Strategic<br>deliberate incumbent moves"]
ST --> DE["Deter entry: product proliferation, long exclusive contracts, excess capacity"]
ST --> EX["Induce exit: predatory pricing, vaporware"]
ST --> CR{"Credible?<br>still rational to carry out after entry<br>sunk investment = credible signal"}
class ST key
class CR bad
| Concept | In one line | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Institutional | Barriers set by policymakers | Taxi licences, TV frequencies; UberPop banned in Italy |
| Structural | From cost or demand structure | A leading-edge TSMC fab costs tens of billions, plus learning curves (coursemicroprocessors); Ryanair's scale (coursewrap-up 2) |
| Product proliferation | Fill every segment so no room is left | Kellogg's and Nestlé shelves full of cereal variants (coursecereal) |
| Exclusive contracts | Lock up the best suppliers before patents expire | Apple reserving TSMC's newest process capacity |
| Excess capacity | Spare capacity as a credible threat | Ryanair ordering 150 Boeing 737 MAX with options for 150 more (2023) |
| Vaporware | Announce unfinished products to make buyers wait | Microsoft was often accused of this in the 1990s |
| Predatory pricing | Price below MC to push a rival out, then raise it again | Amazon slashing diaper prices against Diapers.com, then buying its parent; EasyJet vs KLM (course) |
| Areeda-Turner | Two tests: price < MC (proxy: variable cost) AND recoupment foreseeable from the start | The cost test competition authorities use |
| Chicago School | Rational agents, perfect information, efficient capital markets: the entrant can borrow and survive, so predation never pays | (theory, no company) |
| False positive / negative | False positive: normal competition punished. False negative: real predation missed, efficient rival forced out | coursepractice tends to minimise false positives |
Barbershop (wrap-up 2): structural and institutional barriers are both low. Lobbying the city to stop new barbershops nearby is a strategic barrier.
7 Vertical relations (02.09, 02.10)
flowchart TB VI["Three reasons for vertical integration"] --> T["Technological<br>process industries: chemicals, steel"] VI --> E["Efficiency"] VI --> P["Extend market power"] E --> DM["Remove double marginalisation<br>two monopoly markups become one"] E --> HT["Cut transaction costs<br>bounded rationality + opportunism + specific assets"] P --> FC["Vertical foreclosure<br>cheap input for own unit, monopoly price for rivals"] class E key class P bad
| Concept | In one line | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Upstream / downstream | Upstream = buy your supplier; downstream = buy your distribution | Apple's own M-series chips (upstream); Tesla's own stores (downstream) |
| Double marginalisation | Upstream and downstream monopolies each add a markup; merging removes one, so the final price FALLS | Netflix producing its own shows instead of paying a studio's markup |
| High transaction costs | Contracts stall and hold-up is likely, so integrate | GM buying Fisher Body (courseefficiency case) |
| Vertical foreclosure | An upstream monopolist integrates downstream and charges rivals the monopoly price | Google Shopping (EU, 2017): favouring its own comparison service in search results |
| Specific assets | Specialised, dedicated, site-specific (pipelines) and human capital | Oil pipelines and pumping stations (course) |
8 Network industries (02.11, 02.12)
flowchart LR S1["Start-up<br>few users, low value<br>everyone waits"] -->|"cross critical mass"| S2["Growth<br>bandwagon effect"] S2 --> S3["Maturity"] X["Six start-up strategies<br>compatibility and alliances, promo prices, free for trendsetters<br>tolerate piracy, advertising, public subsidies"] --> S1 class S1 bad class S2 key
| Concept | In one line | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Direct externality | More users on the same network directly raise its value | WhatsApp is only useful if your friends use it |
| Indirect externality | More users, more complements, more value | More PlayStation owners, more games; more iPhone users, more apps |
| Competition for the market | Technology-driven; a leader can be replaced within 1 to 3 years | BlackBerry and Nokia overtaken by iPhone and Android (courseBlackBerry 45% to 3%) |
| Critical mass | Minimum satisfied users for the network to spread by itself. Demand is an inverted U; cutting price later signals the good will not diffuse | Facebook won Harvard first, then expanded; Google+ never got there |
| Promotional prices | Often below average cost | Consoles sold below cost (course); Uber's early subsidised rides |
| Freeware to trendsetters | Give it free to influencers so others copy | Clubhouse inviting celebrities first; Twitter and Instagram influencers (course) |
| Public subsidies | State builds the network but can crowd out other technologies | France's Minitel (course); EV purchase subsidies |
| Alliance risks | Free riding and spillovers | Members of the Wi-Fi or USB groups who contribute little but benefit equally |
9 Compatibility, standards wars, replacement (02.13, 02.14)
flowchart LR G["Leader payoff − follower payoff"] -->|"small gap (6 − 4 = 2)"| ONE["One leads, one follows<br>single standard"] G -->|"large gap (6)"| WAR["Both want to lead<br>standards war"] LF["Licensing fees ↑"] --> G AC["Absorption costs ↑"] --> G class WAR bad class ONE key
| Concept | In one line | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Backward compatibility | The new version of the same product works with the old one, not vice versa | PS5 runs most PS4 games; new Word opens old .doc files |
| One-way compatibility | Firm A's product works with B's format, not vice versa | Apple Numbers opens Excel files; Excel cannot open .numbers |
| Standards war | Incompatible standards fight; the market tips to one | VHS beat Betamax (course, not the first mover); Blu-ray beat HD DVD; USB-C replaced Lightning |
| Credibility signals | Size, financial resources, complementary assets, brand | Sony's Columbia Pictures films helped Blu-ray win |
| Coopetition | The higher the sunk R&D cost, the stronger the push to share a standard | Apple, Google and Amazon co-developed the Matter smart-home standard |
| Switching costs | Learning, search, performance gap, price gap, expectations. A newcomer needs p_incumbent − p_newcomer ≥ SC; easiest in fast-growing markets | Moving from iPhone to Android: iMessage, apps, photos |
| Excess inertia | A better new technology is not adopted | The QWERTY keyboard (classic, though debated) |
| Excess momentum | A new technology replaces an old one that was better for everyone | (definition only; remember it as the opposite of inertia) |
10 Competition policy and innovation (03.01 to 03.05)
flowchart LR INV["Invention<br>knowledge breakthrough"] --> INN["Innovation<br>brought to market or adopted in production"] INN --> BEN["Benefits flow to: innovator, consumers, suppliers, imitators"] BEN --> GAP["Private return 25% < social return 55%<br>gap = 30 percentage points → under-investment"] GAP --> POL["Policy: lower cost (subsidies, credit 1 − s)<br>or raise returns (patents, public demand, basic research)"] class GAP bad class POL key
| Concept | In one line | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Natural monopoly regulation | Price set below the profit-maximising level, but revenue must still cover costs | ARERA setting Terna's transmission tariffs |
| Abuse of dominant position | Being dominant is legal; abusing it is not | EU fine of €4.34bn on Google (2018) for tying Google Search to Android |
| Invention vs innovation | Invention is the breakthrough; innovation brings it to market | Xerox invented the GUI and mouse; Apple's Macintosh brought them to market (course) |
| R&D tax credit | Private cost falls from 1 to 1 − s, so projects returning between 1 − s and 1 become worth funding | Italy's credito d'imposta R&S |
| Arrow | Competitors innovate to escape competition; a monopolist fears cannibalising its own profits, so antitrust also helps innovation | Kodak invented the digital camera but held back to protect film (courseMicrosoft in PC operating systems) |
| Contestable market | High market power + low entry barriers = strong incentive to innovate | Intel's heavy yearly R&D (course); Nokia, which did not keep up |
| Schumpeter | Firms innovate for a temporary monopoly; too much competition kills innovation, hence patents | Pharma firms recouping R&D through 20-year patents |
| Inverted U | Low competition: more competition helps (Arrow). High competition: less helps (Schumpeter). Peak: dynamic oligopoly | Smartphones: Apple, Samsung, Xiaomi compete hard and still earn profits |
| Appropriability | How much of the benefit the innovator keeps. Tight = low spillovers | Xerox's mouse made money for Apple and Microsoft (course) |
| Absorptive capacity | You need your own R&D to absorb outside knowledge; with fast-changing knowledge, more spillovers can raise R&D | Samsung as a fast follower in new technologies |
| Four patent problems | Must be codified, becomes public, rivals invent around (the biggest), court defence slow and costly | Apple vs Samsung patent war, 2011 to 2018 |
| Strategic protection | Secrecy, learning curves, lead time, complementary assets (the most important) | Coca-Cola's secret formula; the Intel Inside brand (course) |
Common traps
| Trap | How to remember |
|---|---|
| Natural vs resource vs legal monopoly | Ask where the monopoly comes from: cost structure = natural; owning a resource = resources; granted by law = legal |
| Elasticity and markup | Lower elasticity → higher markup → price can go up |
| Percentage points vs percent | 25% to 55% is a gap of 30 percentage points, which is 120% higher in relative terms. "30% higher" is wrong |
| Wealth transfer vs allocative inefficiency | Extra money paid on units sold = transfer; surplus lost on trades that never happen = dead-weight loss |
| Double marginalisation | Merging two monopolies in a chain LOWERS the final price |
| GM and Fisher Body | An efficiency case (transaction costs), not foreclosure |
| Contestable incumbent vs Arrow | High share but still heavy R&D = fear of being replaced (Intel). Arrow says a comfortable monopolist innovates LESS |