BIE · ONE PAGE

Business & Industrial Economics: One-Page Concepts

Every concept with a diagram and a well-known company example. Examples tagged course come from the clips or wrap-ups and may appear in the exam; the others are only memory aids. ← All BIE resources

1 Industry profits and market power (01.01)

flowchart LR
MP["Market power<br>p > MC"] --> W["Wealth transfer<br>buyers who still buy pay more"]
MP --> AI["Allocative inefficiency<br>buyers with WTP between MC and p drop out"]
MP --> PI["Productive inefficiency<br>no pressure to cut costs"]
MP --> RC["Capture of the regulator<br>lobbying to keep privileges"]
W & AI & PI & RC --> POL{"Policy"}
POL --> AT["Antitrust<br>block cartels and mergers"]
POL --> RG["Regulation<br>set prices directly"]
class MP key
class AI bad
ConceptIn one lineExample
IndustryFirms whose products consumers see as substitutes. Check the geographic dimension: demand-side (will buyers buy from elsewhere?) and supply-side (will firms sell elsewhere?)Coca-Cola and Pepsi are in the same industry; so are Netflix and Disney+
Profit driversDemand, costs, number and intensity of competitorsPfizer and other pharma firms earn high margins; telecoms like TIM and Vodafone earn low ones (coursepharma vs telecom)
Four ways to escape competitionDifferentiation, collusion, entry barriers, innovationApple (differentiation), OPEC (collusion), taxi licences vs Uber (barriers), Nvidia's AI chips (innovation)
Market powerThe ability to price above marginal costAn iPhone sells far above the cost of making one more unit
Allocative inefficiencyPeople who value the good above MC but below the price do not buy; that lost surplus is the dead-weight lossSomeone would pay €500 for an iPhone (above its cost) but it costs €1,000, so the beneficial trade never happens
Productive inefficiencyNo competitive pressure, so costs stay highAlitalia, long protected by the state, ran at much higher costs than Ryanair
Capture of the regulatorWhen market power comes from policy, firms spend resources lobbying to keep itItalian taxi drivers lobbying and striking against Uber (coursetaxi licences)
Antitrust vs regulationAntitrust protects competition; regulation sets prices directlyEU fines on Google (antitrust); Italy's ARERA sets energy network tariffs (regulation)
Wealth transfer is about units that ARE sold. Allocative inefficiency is about trades that do NOT happen.

2 Transaction costs (01.05)

flowchart LR
SI["Relation-specific investment<br>only useful for this buyer"] --> HU["Hold-up<br>the other side squeezes the price later"]
IC["Incomplete contracts<br>bounded rationality"] --> HU
HU --> TC["High transaction costs"]
TC --> INT["Internalise<br>buy the supplier or distributor"]
class HU bad
class INT key
ConceptIn one lineExample
Transaction costsAll costs of completing a deal: search, negotiation, contract, checking it is honouredSelling a used phone on Vinted or eBay: find a buyer, agree a price, make sure you get paid
Ex ante vs ex postBefore: search, drafting. After: monitoring, enforcement (even court)Airbnb: filtering listings is ex ante; a guest who breaks furniture and refuses to pay is ex post (course)
Why firms existBuying every step on the market would cost too much, so steps are done inside one firmZara designs, produces and ships to its own stores instead of negotiating each step
Relation-specific investmentAn investment made for one deal, worthless if the deal failsFoxconn lines built only for iPhones
Hold-upThe side that did not invest exploits contract gaps; the investor is locked inGM and Fisher Body (course): GM ended up buying Fisher Body
Economies of scopeMaking two products together is cheaper than separatelyAmazon runs its own retail, third-party sellers and Prime on one logistics network

3 Information asymmetry (01.07 to 01.10)

flowchart TB
A["Information asymmetry"] --> B["Before the deal: hidden information"]
A --> C["After the deal: hidden action"]
B --> D["Adverse selection"]
C --> E["Moral hazard"]
D --> F["Fix: signalling<br>costly, costlier for low types, observable"]
E --> G["Fix: incentive contracts<br>deductible, fixed + variable pay, staging"]
class D,E bad
class F,G key
ConceptIn one lineExample
Adverse selectionQuality is hidden, buyers pay the average, good sellers leave, only lemons remainUsed cars (courseAkerlof), which is why AutoScout24-style platforms add inspection reports
SignallingAn observable cue correlated with quality, costlier for low types. Separating condition c_H < w_H − w_L < c_LA Polimi degree or a Google internship; Airbnb Superhost (course)
Moral hazardAfter the contract, the other side's behaviour is hidden and they act opportunisticallyFull theft insurance, so no good padlock (course); an Airbnb guest throwing a party (course)
Principal-agentThe principal delegates to an agent whose interests differTesla shareholders and their CEO
Incentive contractMakes opportunism unattractiveMusk's 2018 pay package tied entirely to market-value milestones; insurance deductibles
StagingVC money released in tranches when milestones are hitAirbnb and Uber raising Seed, Series A, B, C
Before the deal = adverse selection = signalling. After the deal = moral hazard = incentive contracts. Do not cross the pairs.

4 Monopoly and oligopoly (02.02 to 02.04)

flowchart LR
M["Monopoly<br>MR = MC<br>highest price, lowest output"] --> CO["Cournot duopoly<br>choose quantities<br>middle price, positive profit"]
CO --> BE["Bertrand duopoly<br>identical goods, set prices<br>p = MC, zero profit"]
BE --> PC["Perfect competition<br>p = MC"]
class M bad
class PC key
flowchart TB
MO["Where does the monopoly come from?"] --> L["An exclusive legal right<br>→ Legal monopoly"]
MO --> R["Control of a key resource<br>→ Monopoly of resources"]
MO --> N["Cost structure: average cost keeps falling, small market<br>one firm is cheapest, a second raises everyone's cost<br>→ Natural monopoly"]
class N key
ConceptIn one lineExample
Legal monopolyAn exclusive right granted by law, e.g. a patentNovo Nordisk's Ozempic during its patent life
Monopoly of resourcesExclusive control of a key resourceDe Beers once controlled most diamond mines; Saudi Aramco (courseMENA oil)
Natural monopolyHigh fixed cost, low variable cost: one firm is most efficientTerna's electricity grid or the water pipes: building two networks only raises costs
Monopoly pricingLower elasticity, higher markup: (p − mc)/p = 1/|ε|. MR has twice the slope of demandEpiPen: patients cannot go without it, demand is inelastic, and Mylan raised the price sharply for years
Bertrand trapIdentical goods, simultaneous prices: undercutting until p = MC and zero profitEni and Q8 stations on the same road charge almost the same (coursefuel is homogeneous)
CollusionJointly keeping prices high. Stable with repeated interaction (punishment), good future profits, low discount rateOPEC coordinating output
CournotChoose capacity or quantity, anticipating the rival's output. Markup (p − MC)/p = s_i/|ε|: bigger share, bigger markupAirbus and Boeing decide how many planes to build; prices follow total supply
Low elasticity means the firm CAN raise price (customers cannot leave). It does not mean "cut price to keep volume".

5 Product differentiation (02.05)

ConceptIn one lineExample
DifferentiationLowers substitutability and demand elasticity, avoiding price warsStarbucks sells a "third place" experience at prices far above a vending machine
Spatial differentiationSame product, different places; the closer seller can charge up to the travel costThe convenience store downstairs costs more than the supermarket further away, and you still go
HotellingTwo beach vendors end up side by side in the middleMcDonald's and Burger King often open next to each other
When not to differentiateIf preferences barely vary, heavy differentiation does not pay; collusion or joint supply restriction insteadEni and Shell fuel is basically the same (course)
CoopetitionWith high spillovers, co-develop and then competeToyota and BMW share a platform (Supra and Z4) and sell under their own brands

6 Entry barriers and predatory pricing (02.06 to 02.08)

flowchart TB
EB["Entry barriers"] --> I["Institutional<br>set by policy: licences, permits, patents"]
EB --> S["Structural<br>demand and cost structure: scale, learning curves, scarce resources"]
EB --> ST["Strategic<br>deliberate incumbent moves"]
ST --> DE["Deter entry: product proliferation, long exclusive contracts, excess capacity"]
ST --> EX["Induce exit: predatory pricing, vaporware"]
ST --> CR{"Credible?<br>still rational to carry out after entry<br>sunk investment = credible signal"}
class ST key
class CR bad
ConceptIn one lineExample
InstitutionalBarriers set by policymakersTaxi licences, TV frequencies; UberPop banned in Italy
StructuralFrom cost or demand structureA leading-edge TSMC fab costs tens of billions, plus learning curves (coursemicroprocessors); Ryanair's scale (coursewrap-up 2)
Product proliferationFill every segment so no room is leftKellogg's and Nestlé shelves full of cereal variants (coursecereal)
Exclusive contractsLock up the best suppliers before patents expireApple reserving TSMC's newest process capacity
Excess capacitySpare capacity as a credible threatRyanair ordering 150 Boeing 737 MAX with options for 150 more (2023)
VaporwareAnnounce unfinished products to make buyers waitMicrosoft was often accused of this in the 1990s
Predatory pricingPrice below MC to push a rival out, then raise it againAmazon slashing diaper prices against Diapers.com, then buying its parent; EasyJet vs KLM (course)
Areeda-TurnerTwo tests: price < MC (proxy: variable cost) AND recoupment foreseeable from the startThe cost test competition authorities use
Chicago SchoolRational agents, perfect information, efficient capital markets: the entrant can borrow and survive, so predation never pays(theory, no company)
False positive / negativeFalse positive: normal competition punished. False negative: real predation missed, efficient rival forced outcoursepractice tends to minimise false positives
Barbershop (wrap-up 2): structural and institutional barriers are both low. Lobbying the city to stop new barbershops nearby is a strategic barrier.

7 Vertical relations (02.09, 02.10)

flowchart TB
VI["Three reasons for vertical integration"] --> T["Technological<br>process industries: chemicals, steel"]
VI --> E["Efficiency"]
VI --> P["Extend market power"]
E --> DM["Remove double marginalisation<br>two monopoly markups become one"]
E --> HT["Cut transaction costs<br>bounded rationality + opportunism + specific assets"]
P --> FC["Vertical foreclosure<br>cheap input for own unit, monopoly price for rivals"]
class E key
class P bad
ConceptIn one lineExample
Upstream / downstreamUpstream = buy your supplier; downstream = buy your distributionApple's own M-series chips (upstream); Tesla's own stores (downstream)
Double marginalisationUpstream and downstream monopolies each add a markup; merging removes one, so the final price FALLSNetflix producing its own shows instead of paying a studio's markup
High transaction costsContracts stall and hold-up is likely, so integrateGM buying Fisher Body (courseefficiency case)
Vertical foreclosureAn upstream monopolist integrates downstream and charges rivals the monopoly priceGoogle Shopping (EU, 2017): favouring its own comparison service in search results
Specific assetsSpecialised, dedicated, site-specific (pipelines) and human capitalOil pipelines and pumping stations (course)

8 Network industries (02.11, 02.12)

flowchart LR
S1["Start-up<br>few users, low value<br>everyone waits"] -->|"cross critical mass"| S2["Growth<br>bandwagon effect"]
S2 --> S3["Maturity"]
X["Six start-up strategies<br>compatibility and alliances, promo prices, free for trendsetters<br>tolerate piracy, advertising, public subsidies"] --> S1
class S1 bad
class S2 key
ConceptIn one lineExample
Direct externalityMore users on the same network directly raise its valueWhatsApp is only useful if your friends use it
Indirect externalityMore users, more complements, more valueMore PlayStation owners, more games; more iPhone users, more apps
Competition for the marketTechnology-driven; a leader can be replaced within 1 to 3 yearsBlackBerry and Nokia overtaken by iPhone and Android (courseBlackBerry 45% to 3%)
Critical massMinimum satisfied users for the network to spread by itself. Demand is an inverted U; cutting price later signals the good will not diffuseFacebook won Harvard first, then expanded; Google+ never got there
Promotional pricesOften below average costConsoles sold below cost (course); Uber's early subsidised rides
Freeware to trendsettersGive it free to influencers so others copyClubhouse inviting celebrities first; Twitter and Instagram influencers (course)
Public subsidiesState builds the network but can crowd out other technologiesFrance's Minitel (course); EV purchase subsidies
Alliance risksFree riding and spilloversMembers of the Wi-Fi or USB groups who contribute little but benefit equally

9 Compatibility, standards wars, replacement (02.13, 02.14)

flowchart LR
G["Leader payoff − follower payoff"] -->|"small gap (6 − 4 = 2)"| ONE["One leads, one follows<br>single standard"]
G -->|"large gap (6)"| WAR["Both want to lead<br>standards war"]
LF["Licensing fees ↑"] --> G
AC["Absorption costs ↑"] --> G
class WAR bad
class ONE key
ConceptIn one lineExample
Backward compatibilityThe new version of the same product works with the old one, not vice versaPS5 runs most PS4 games; new Word opens old .doc files
One-way compatibilityFirm A's product works with B's format, not vice versaApple Numbers opens Excel files; Excel cannot open .numbers
Standards warIncompatible standards fight; the market tips to oneVHS beat Betamax (course, not the first mover); Blu-ray beat HD DVD; USB-C replaced Lightning
Credibility signalsSize, financial resources, complementary assets, brandSony's Columbia Pictures films helped Blu-ray win
CoopetitionThe higher the sunk R&D cost, the stronger the push to share a standardApple, Google and Amazon co-developed the Matter smart-home standard
Switching costsLearning, search, performance gap, price gap, expectations. A newcomer needs p_incumbent − p_newcomer ≥ SC; easiest in fast-growing marketsMoving from iPhone to Android: iMessage, apps, photos
Excess inertiaA better new technology is not adoptedThe QWERTY keyboard (classic, though debated)
Excess momentumA new technology replaces an old one that was better for everyone(definition only; remember it as the opposite of inertia)

10 Competition policy and innovation (03.01 to 03.05)

Dynamic oligopoly: most innovation Arrow zone Too little competition, no pressure → more competition, more innovation Schumpeter zone Too much competition, R&D not recouped → less competition, more innovation MonopolyPerfect competition Degree of competition → Incentive to innovate
flowchart LR
INV["Invention<br>knowledge breakthrough"] --> INN["Innovation<br>brought to market or adopted in production"]
INN --> BEN["Benefits flow to: innovator, consumers, suppliers, imitators"]
BEN --> GAP["Private return 25% < social return 55%<br>gap = 30 percentage points → under-investment"]
GAP --> POL["Policy: lower cost (subsidies, credit 1 − s)<br>or raise returns (patents, public demand, basic research)"]
class GAP bad
class POL key
ConceptIn one lineExample
Natural monopoly regulationPrice set below the profit-maximising level, but revenue must still cover costsARERA setting Terna's transmission tariffs
Abuse of dominant positionBeing dominant is legal; abusing it is notEU fine of €4.34bn on Google (2018) for tying Google Search to Android
Invention vs innovationInvention is the breakthrough; innovation brings it to marketXerox invented the GUI and mouse; Apple's Macintosh brought them to market (course)
R&D tax creditPrivate cost falls from 1 to 1 − s, so projects returning between 1 − s and 1 become worth fundingItaly's credito d'imposta R&S
ArrowCompetitors innovate to escape competition; a monopolist fears cannibalising its own profits, so antitrust also helps innovationKodak invented the digital camera but held back to protect film (courseMicrosoft in PC operating systems)
Contestable marketHigh market power + low entry barriers = strong incentive to innovateIntel's heavy yearly R&D (course); Nokia, which did not keep up
SchumpeterFirms innovate for a temporary monopoly; too much competition kills innovation, hence patentsPharma firms recouping R&D through 20-year patents
Inverted ULow competition: more competition helps (Arrow). High competition: less helps (Schumpeter). Peak: dynamic oligopolySmartphones: Apple, Samsung, Xiaomi compete hard and still earn profits
AppropriabilityHow much of the benefit the innovator keeps. Tight = low spilloversXerox's mouse made money for Apple and Microsoft (course)
Absorptive capacityYou need your own R&D to absorb outside knowledge; with fast-changing knowledge, more spillovers can raise R&DSamsung as a fast follower in new technologies
Four patent problemsMust be codified, becomes public, rivals invent around (the biggest), court defence slow and costlyApple vs Samsung patent war, 2011 to 2018
Strategic protectionSecrecy, learning curves, lead time, complementary assets (the most important)Coca-Cola's secret formula; the Intel Inside brand (course)

Common traps

TrapHow to remember
Natural vs resource vs legal monopolyAsk where the monopoly comes from: cost structure = natural; owning a resource = resources; granted by law = legal
Elasticity and markupLower elasticity → higher markup → price can go up
Percentage points vs percent25% to 55% is a gap of 30 percentage points, which is 120% higher in relative terms. "30% higher" is wrong
Wealth transfer vs allocative inefficiencyExtra money paid on units sold = transfer; surplus lost on trades that never happen = dead-weight loss
Double marginalisationMerging two monopolies in a chain LOWERS the final price
GM and Fisher BodyAn efficiency case (transaction costs), not foreclosure
Contestable incumbent vs ArrowHigh share but still heavy R&D = fear of being replaced (Intel). Arrow says a comfortable monopolist innovates LESS